Қӯшунҳои Бритониё дар Фаронса истиқбол карда мешаванд, 1914

Қӯшунҳои Бритониё дар Фаронса истиқбол карда мешаванд, 1914



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Қӯшунҳои Бритониё дар Фаронса истиқбол карда мешаванд, 1914

Ҳангоме ки онҳо соли 1914 ба Фаронса омаданд, нерӯҳои Бритониё хеле хуш омаданд. Дар ин ҷо мо мебинем, ки як қисми БЭФ -ро хонумони фаронсавӣ ҳангоми расидан ба Фаронса дар моҳи августи соли 1914 истиқбол мекунанд.


Империя ва қудрати баҳр

Дар моҳи сентябри соли 1715, Ҷон Эрскин, Эрл Мар, стандарти болоравии "якобит" -ро баланд бардошт, ки ният дошт монархияи бадарғаи Стюартро ба тахт баргардонад ва Ҷеймс Франсис Эдвард Стюартро (писари Яъқуби II) подшоҳи Шотландия эълон кард. Яъқубиён дар моҳи ноябри соли 1715 аз ҷониби нерӯҳои ҳукуматӣ дар набардҳои Шерифмюир ва Престон мағлуб шуданд. Пас аз се моҳ исён барҳам дода шуд. Роҳбарони Яъқуб импичмент эълон карда шуданд ва баъзеҳо ба қатл расонида шуданд.


Мундариҷа

Тибқи нақшаҳои пеш аз ҷанг, бояд аз байни қувваҳои артиши муқаррарӣ дар Британияи Кабир як нерӯи экспедитсионӣ ташкил карда мешуд, ки дорои 6 дивизияи пиёда ва як дивизияи савора (72 баталёни пиёда ва 14 полки савора), инчунин ҷузъҳои ёрирасон буд.

Ба нақша гирифта шуда буд, ки ҳафт дивизия аз ҷониби Ситоди генералӣ ба таври мутамарказ назорат карда шаванд ва аз ин рӯ барои сатҳҳои мобайнии фармондеҳӣ нақшаҳо пешбинӣ нашудаанд. Як корманди корпус дар замони осоишта нигоҳ дошта мешуд, аммо тасмим дар бораи сафарбаркунӣ дар бораи таъсиси дуввум (ва баъдтар сеюм) гирифта шуд, то бо сохтори фармондеҳии Фаронса беҳтар мутобиқ карда шавад.

Ҳангоми сафарбаркунӣ, тарси ҷиддии аз соҳили олмонӣ дар соҳили шарқии Англия вуҷуд доштан вуҷуд дошт ва аз ин рӯ, тасмим гирифта шуд, ки ду дивизияро барои дифои хонагӣ боздорад ва танҳо чор ва илова ба он дивизияи савора ба Фаронса фиристода шавад. барои ҳозира. Дар ниҳоят 4 -ум дар охири моҳи август ва 6 -ум дар аввали сентябр фиристода шуданд.

Сарфармондеҳи ибтидоии BEF фельдмаршал сэр Ҷон Франс буд. Сардори ситоди ӯ генерал-лейтенант сэр А. Ҷ. GSO 1 (Амалиёт) полковник Г.М. Ҳарпер ва GSO 1 (Разведка) полковник Г.М.В. Макдоног буд.

Адъютанти генерал генерал-майор сэр Ф.Н.Макрид буд, бо генерал-майор Э. Кварталмастер-генерал генерал-майор сэр В.Р.Робертсон буд, бо полковник Ч.Доукинс ёрдамчии квартирмейстер-генерал. Ба Артиллерияи шоҳӣ генерал-майор В.Ф.Линдсей ва муҳандисони шоҳӣ генерал-генерал Г.Х.Фоук фармондеҳӣ мекарданд.

Қӯшунҳои GHQ, муҳандисони шоҳона Таҳрир

Қӯшунҳои ситоди генералӣ муҳандисони гурӯҳи артишро назорат мекарданд. Он дар соли 1914 сохтори зерин дошт: [4]

  • Поезди 1 -уми пулсозӣ, Муҳандисони шоҳона
  • Поезди 2 -юми пулсозӣ, Муҳандисони шоҳона
  • Ширкати муҳосираи 1, Royal Monmouthshire Militia, Royal Engineering
  • Ширкати 4 -и муҳосира, милитсияи шоҳии Монмутшир, муҳандисони шоҳона
  • Ширкати 1 -и муҳосира, милитсияи шоҳии Англси, муҳандисони шоҳона
  • Ширкати 2 -юми муҳосира, милитсияи шоҳии Англси, муҳандисони шоҳона
  • Бахши дараҷаи 1, муҳандисони шоҳона
  • Муассисаи нақлиёти роҳи оҳан
    • Ширкати 8 -уми роҳи оҳан, муҳандисони шоҳона
    • Ширкати 10 -уми роҳи оҳан, муҳандисони шоҳона
    • Ширкати 2 -юми роҳи оҳан, милитсияи шоҳии Монмутшир, муҳандисони шоҳона
    • Ширкати 3 -юми роҳи оҳан, милитсияи шоҳии Монмутшир, муҳандисони шоҳона
    • Ширкати 3 -юми роҳи оҳан, милитсияи шоҳии Англси, муҳандисони шоҳона

    Дар Артиши Бритониё дар мавриди сафарбаркунӣ ягон дивизияи савораи доимӣ таъсис дода нашуда буд, бригадаҳои аз 1 то 4 савора якҷоя карда шуда, дивизия ташкил карданд, дар ҳоле ки бригадаи 5 -уми савора ҳамчун воҳиди мустақил боқӣ монд.

    6 сентябр, бригадаи 3-юми савора ҷудо карда шуд, ки дар якҷоягӣ бо 5-ум таҳти фармондеҳии умумии бригадир Гоу амал кунад. Ин қувва рӯзи 16 сентябр дубора ба дивизияи 2-юми савора таъин карда шуд.

    Таҳрири дивизияи савора

    Дивизияи савора аз ҷониби генерал-майор Эдмунд Алленби фармондеҳӣ мешуд ва полковник Ҷон Воган ҳамчун GSO 1 ва генерал-бригадир Б.Ф.Дрейк фармондеҳи артиллерияи аспии шоҳӣ буд.

    Бригадаи мустакил Тахрир

    I Корпусро генерал-лейтенант сэр Дуглас Ҳейг фармондеҳӣ мекард. Кормандони аршади ӯ генерал-генерал Ҷ.

    Таҳрири шӯъбаи 1

    Дивизияи 1-умро генерал-майор С.Х.Ломакс, бо полковник Р.Фаншоу ҳамчун GSO 1. Фармондеҳи артиллерияи шоҳӣ генерал-генерал Н.Д.Финдлей ва муҳандисони подшоҳ подполковник А.Л.Шрайбер фармондеҳӣ мекарданд.

      (Бригадаи генерал F. I. Maxse)
      • Гвардияи 1 -уми сард
      • Гвардияи 1 -уми Шотландия
      • 1 -ум The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)
      • 2 -юм Фузилерҳои Royal Munster [7]
      • 2 -юм полки Шоҳии Сассекс
      • 1 Полки вафодори Ланкашир Шимолӣ
      • 1 полки Нортхэмптоншир
      • Корпуси 2 -юми подшоҳии шоҳ
      • 1 -уми Малика (Полки Шоҳии Ғарбӣ)
      • 1 сарҳадбонони Ҷанубӣ Уэлс
      • 1 -ум полки Глостерширшир
      • Полки 2 -юми Велч
      • Қӯшунҳои савор
        • Эскадрилья, 15 (Ҳусарҳои подшоҳ)
        • Ширкати велосипедронии 1
          • Батареяи 113, RFA
          • Батареяи 114, RFA
          • Батареяи 115 -ум, RFA
          • Батареяи 116, RFA
          • Батареяи 117, RFA
          • Батареяи 118 -ум, RFA
          • Батареяи 46 -ум, RFA
          • Батареяи 51 -ум, RFA
          • Батареяи 54, RFA
          • Батареяи 30th (Howitzer), RFA
          • Батареяи 40 -ум (Howitzer), RFA
          • Батареяи 57th (Howitzer), RFA
          • Ширкати 23 -юми саҳроӣ, RE
          • Ширкати 26th Field, RE

          Таҳрири шӯъбаи 2

          Дивизияи 2-юмро генерал-майор C. C. Monro бо полковник Хон фармондеҳӣ мекард. Ф.Гордон ҳамчун GSO 1. Генерал-бригадир Э.М.Персевал ба артиллерияи шоҳӣ фармондеҳӣ мекард ва подполковник Р.

            (Бригадам генерал Р. Скотт-Кер)
            • Гвардияи 2 -юми Гренадер
            • Гвардияи 2 -юми сард
            • Гвардияи 3 -юми сард
            • Гвардияи 1 -уми Ирландия
            • 2 -юми полки Вустерширшир
            • 2 -юм Пиёдаҳои сабуки Оксфордшир ва Букингемшир
            • 2 -юм Аскарони Пиёдаи Нур
            • 2 -юм Коннейндж Рейнджерс
            • 1 -уми шоҳ (полки Ливерпул)
            • 2 -юм полки Ҷанубии Стаффордшир
            • 1 Маликаи Шарлоттаи Уэлс (Полки Шоҳии Беркшир)
            • Корпуси милтиқи шоҳии 1 -уми шоҳ
            • Қӯшунҳои савор
              • Б эскадрилья, 15 -ум (гуссарҳо)
              • Ширкати 2 -юми велосипедронон
                • Батареяи 22, RFA
                • Батареяи 50 -ум, RFA
                • Батареяи 70 -ум, RFA
                • Батареяи 15, RFA
                • Батареяи 48 -ум, RFA
                • Батареяи 71, RFA
                • Батареяи 9, RFA
                • Батареяи 16, RFA
                • Батареяи 17, RFA
                • Батареяи 47 -ум (Howitzer), RFA
                • Батареяи 56th (Howitzer), RFA
                • Батареяи 60th (Howitzer), RFA
                • Ширкати 5th Field, RE
                • Ширкати 11th Field, RE

                II Корпусро генерал-лейтенант сэр Ҷеймс Гриерсон фармондеҳӣ мекард. Офицерони калони ӯ генерал-генерал Ҷорҷ Форестье-Уолкер (сардори штаб), генерал-бригадир А.Х. Шорт (фармондеҳи артиллерияи шоҳона) ва генерал-бригадир А.Э. Сандбах (фармондеҳи муҳандисони шоҳӣ) буданд.

                Генерал-лейтенант Гриерсон рӯзи 17 август дар қатори байни Руан ва Амьен вафот кард, генерал Ҳорас Смит-Дорриен фармондеҳиро дар Бавай, 21 август соати 4:00 ба ӯҳда гирифт.

                Таҳрири шӯъбаи 3

                Дивизияи 3-юмро генерал-майор Ҳуберт И.В. Ҳамилтон фармондеҳӣ мекард, бо полковник F. R. F. Boileau ҳамчун GSO 1. Фармондеҳи генерал артиллерияи шоҳона генерал Д.Д.Винг ва подполковник C. S. Wilson фармондеҳи муҳандисони шоҳӣ буданд.

                  (Бригадаи генерал F. W. N. McCracken)
                  • 3 -юм полки Вустерширшир
                  • 2 -юм ихтиёриёни шоҳзодаи Уэлс (полки Ланкашир)
                  • 1 Герсоги Эдинбург (Полки Уилтшир)
                  • 2 -юм милтиқи шоҳии ирландӣ
                  • 2 -юми Шоҳии Шотландия (Полки Лотиан)
                  • 2 -юм полки Шоҳии Ирландия
                  • 4 -уми герцоги худи Кембриҷ (полки Миддлсекс)
                  • 1 -ум кӯҳистониҳои Гордон [8]
                    (Бригадам генерал Ф. Шоу)
                    • 1 -уми Фусилери Нортумберланд
                    • 4 -уми Шоҳигарии Шоҳона (Шаҳри Полки Лондон)
                    • 1 полки Линколншир
                    • 1 -ум Фусилиерҳои Шоҳии Шотландия
                    • Қӯшунҳои савор
                      • C эскадрилья, 15 -ум (гуссарҳо)
                      • Ширкати 3 -юми велосипедронон
                        • Батареяи 107 -ум, RFA
                        • Батареяи 108 -ум, RFA
                        • Батареяи 109 -ум, RFA
                        • Батареяи 6, RFA
                        • Батареяи 23 -юм, RFA
                        • Батареяи 49 -ум, RFA
                        • Батареяи 29, RFA
                        • Батареяи 41 -ум, RFA
                        • Батареяи 45 -ум, RFA
                        • Батареяи 128th (Howitzer), RFA
                        • Батареяи 129th (Howitzer), RFA
                        • Батареяи 130th (Howitzer), RFA
                        • Ширкати 56th Field, RE
                        • Ширкати 57th Field, RE

                        Таҳрири шӯъбаи 5

                        Ба дивизияи 5 генерал-майор сэр C. Фергюсон фармондеҳӣ мекард, подполковник C.F. Romer ҳамчун GSO 1. Генерал-бригадир Ҷ.В.Хедлам ба артиллерияи шоҳӣ фармондеҳӣ мекард ва подполковник Ҷ.

                          (Генерали бригада Г. Ҷ. Катберт)
                          • 2 -юм Сарҳадбонони худи Шоҳ
                          • 2 -юм Герсоги Веллингтон (Полки савораи Ғарбӣ)
                          • 1 -уми соҳиби Малика (Шоҳии Ғарбии Кент Полк)
                          • Соҳиби 2 -юми подшоҳ (Пиёдаҳои сабуки Йоркшир)
                          • 2 -юми полки Суффолк
                          • 1 полки Шарқии Суррей
                          • 1 -ум Герсоги пиёдаҳои сабуки Корнуолл
                          • 2 -юми полки Манчестер
                          • 1 -уми полки Норфолк
                          • 1 полки Бедфордшир
                          • 1 -уми полки Чешир
                          • 1 -уми полки Дорсетшир
                          • Қӯшунҳои савор
                            • Эскадрилья, 19 (подшоҳи худи Малика Александра) Ҳуссарҳо
                            • Ширкати 5 -уми велосипедронон
                              • Батареяи 11, RFA
                              • Батареяи 52 -юм, RFA
                              • Батареяи 80 -ум, RFA
                              • Батареяи 119, RFA
                              • Батареяи 120 -ум, RFA
                              • Батареяи 121, RFA
                              • Батареяи 122, RFA
                              • Батареяи 123 -юм, RFA
                              • Батареяи 124, RFA
                              • Батареяи 37 -ум (Howitzer), RFA
                              • Батареяи 61 -ум (Howitzer), RFA
                              • Батареяи 65 -ум (Howitzer), RFA
                              • Ширкати 17th Field, RE
                              • Ширкати 59th Field, RE

                              III Корпус дар Фаронса 31 августи соли 1914 таъсис ёфт, ки фармондеҳаш генерал-майор В.П.Пултени буд. Офицерони калони ӯ генерал-генерал Ҷ.П. Ду Кане (сардори штаб), генерал-генерал Э.Ж.Фиппс-Хорнби (фармондеҳи артиллерияи шоҳона) ва генерал-бригадир Ф.М.Глубб (фармондеҳи муҳандисони шоҳӣ) буданд.

                              Таҳрири шӯъбаи 4

                              Дивизияи 4-ум шаби 22 август ва 23 ба Фаронса фуруд омад. Ба он генерал-майор Т.Д'О фармондеҳӣ мекард. Барф, бо полковник Ҷ.

                                (Бригадаи генерал Ҷ. А. Халдане)
                                • 1 -ум полки шоҳии Уорвикшир
                                • 2-юми баландкӯҳҳои Seaforth (Ross-shire Buffs, герцоги Олбани)
                                • Маликаи 1 -уми Виктория (Фусилиерҳои шоҳии Ирландия)
                                • 2 -юм Фузилерҳои Шоҳии Дублин
                                • Аввалин шоҳзода Алберт (Пиёдаҳои сабуки Сомерсет)
                                • 1 -уми полки Ланкашир
                                • 1 полки Ҳэмпшир
                                • Бригадаи 1 -уми тирандозӣ (Шахси Шоҳзода Консор)
                                • Соҳиби 1 -уми Подшоҳ (Полки Шоҳии Ланкастер)
                                • 2 -юм Фузилерҳои Ланкашир
                                • 2 -юми Шоҳии Inniskilling Fusiliers
                                • 2 -юми полки Эссекс
                                • Қӯшунҳои савор
                                  • Б эскадрилья, 19 (подшоҳии худи Малика Александра) Ҳуссарҳо
                                  • Ширкати 4 -уми велосипедронон
                                    • Батареяи 39 -ум, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 68, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 88 -ум, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 125 -ум, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 126, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 127, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 27, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 134, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 135 -ум, RFA
                                    • Батареяи 31 -ум (Howitzer), RFA
                                    • Батареяи 35th (Howitzer), RFA
                                    • Батареяи 55th (Howitzer), RFA
                                    • Ширкати 7th Field, RE
                                    • Ширкати 9th Field, RE

                                    Таҳрири шӯъбаи 6

                                    Дивизияи 6 -ум 8 ва 9 сентябр ба Фаронса сафар кард. Онро генерал-майор Ҷ.

                                      (Бригадаи генерал E. C. Ingouville-Williams)
                                      • 1 -юми Баффҳо (полки Ист Кент)
                                      • 1 -уми полки Лестерширшир
                                      • 1 -уми шоҳ (пиёдаҳои сабуки Шропшир)
                                      • 2 -юм полки Йорк ва Ланкастер
                                      • 1 -уми Шоҳигарии Фусилӣ (Шаҳри Полки Лондон)
                                      • 1 Шоҳзодаи Уэлс (Полки Стаффордшир)
                                      • 2 -юми полки Лейнстери шоҳзодаи Уэлс (шоҳони Канада)
                                      • Бригадаи 3 -юми тирандозӣ (Шахси Шоҳзода)
                                      • 1 -уми Шоҳзодаи Уэлс (Полки Ғарбии Йоркшир)
                                      • 1 полки Шарқии Йоркшир
                                      • 2 -юми Шервуд Форестерҳо (Полки Ноттингемшир ва Дербишир)
                                      • 2 -юм Аскарони пиёдаи сабуки Дарем
                                      • Қӯшунҳои савор
                                        • C эскадрилья, 19 (подшоҳии худи Малика Александра) Ҳуссарҳо
                                        • Ширкати 6 -уми велосипедронон
                                          • Батареяи 21, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 42 -юм, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 53 -юм, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 110 -ум, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 111, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 112, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 24, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 34 -ум, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 72 -юм, RFA
                                          • Батареяи 43 -юм (Howitzer), RFA
                                          • Батареяи 86th (Howitzer), RFA
                                          • Ширкати 12 -уми саҳроӣ, RE
                                          • Ширкати 38th Field, RE
                                            • Батареяи муҳосира № 1
                                            • Батареяи № 2
                                            • Батареяи № 3
                                            • Батареяи № 4
                                            • Батареяи № 5
                                            • Батареяи №6
                                            • 1 -ум Камерон Хайландерҳои соҳиби Малика [7]

                                            Таҳрири шоҳии парвозкунанда

                                            Воҳидҳои корпуси парвозкунандаи шоҳӣ дар Фаронса аз ҷониби генерал-бригадир сэр Дэвид Хендерсон ва подполковник Фредерик Сайкс ба ҳайси сардори ситод фармондеҳӣ мекарданд.

                                            Хатҳои сарбозони мудофиаи коммуникатсия Таҳрир

                                            Як полки савора дорои се эскадрилья буда, бо ду пулемёт таъмин карда шудааст. Дар батальони пиёда чор рота ва ду пулемёт буд.

                                            Батареяи артиллерии шоҳона дорои шаш таппончаи 13-фунт буд, дар ҳоле ки батареяи артиллерии саҳроии шоҳона шаш таппончаи 18-фунтӣ ё шаш гаубицаи 4,5-дюймӣ дошт. Батареяи вазнини артиллерияи гарнизони шоҳона дорои 4 таппончаи 60 фунт буд. Ҳар як батарея дар як таппонча ду вагони ҷангӣ дошт ва ҳар як бригадаи артиллерия сутуни лавозимоти ҷангии худро дошт.

                                            Ҳар як дивизия дар моҳи сентябр як отряди зиддиҳавоии таппончаи 1-помпом, ки ба артиллерияи дивизия васл карда шуда буд, гирифт.

                                            Дивизияи савора дар чаҳор бригада ҳамагӣ 12 полки савора ва ҳар як дивизияи пиёда дар се бригада 12 баталион дошт. Қудрати дивизияи савора (ба ҳисоби бригадаи 5-уми савора) ба 9269 тамоми рутбаҳо расид, ки бо 9815 асп, 24 таппончаи 13-пиёдагард ва 24 пулемёт буданд. Қуввати ҳар як дивизияи пиёда ба 18.073 дараҷа расид, ки 5592 асп, 76 таппонча ва 24 пулемёт дошт.

                                            Ба ибораи васеъ, Нерӯҳои Экспедитсионии Бритониё нисфи қудрати ҷангии Артиши Бритониёро ҳамчун як қудрати императорӣ муаррифӣ мекарданд, як қисми калони артиш бояд барои гарнизонҳои хориҷа нигоҳ дошта мешуд. Интизор мерафт, ки муҳофизати хонаро ихтиёриёни Қувваҳои Ҳудудӣ ва захираҳо таъмин кунанд.

                                            Қувваи умумии Артиши муқаррарӣ дар моҳи июл 125,000 мардро дар ҷазираҳои Бритониё, 75,000 дар Ҳиндустон ва Бирма ва 33,000 дигар дар дигар фиристодани хориҷа буд. Захираи артиш ба 145,000 мардон расид, ки 64,000 дар милитсия (ё захираи махсус) ва 272,000 дар Қувваҳои Ҳудудӣ.

                                            Хидмати хонагӣ Таҳрир

                                            Таъсиси муқаррарии замони осоишта дар ҷазираҳои Бритониё ҳаштоду як баталони аскарони пиёда буд-дар назария, як баталйони ҳар як полки хаттӣ дар хидмати хонагӣ ва як хизмат дар хориҷа дар ҳар лаҳза ҷойгир карда шуда, баталионҳоро дар ҳар чанд сол як маротиба давр мезаданд-ва нуздаҳ полк аз аскарони савора.

                                            Ба ғайр аз онҳое, ки барои Нерӯҳои Экспедитсионӣ пешбинӣ шудаанд, се баталёни гвардия ва ҳашт аскарони пиёдагард (аз ҷумла онҳое, ки дар ҷазираҳои канал) буданд - тақрибан ба як дивизия баробар буд. Дар ин ҳолат, шаш баталони ин мунтазамҳо дар баробари Қувваҳои Экспедитсионӣ ба қитъа фиристода шуданд, то ҳамчун нерӯҳои артиш амал кунанд. Полки сарҳадӣ ва Александра, маликаи соҳиби Уэлс (полки Йоркшир) фарқияти ғайриоддӣ доштанд, ки танҳо ду полки муқаррарии пиёда буданд, ки ба нерӯҳои экспедитсионӣ саҳм намегузоштанд, ҳарду аввалин амалиётро бо дивизияи 7 -ум мебинанд, ки моҳи октябр фуруд омада буданд.

                                            Бо назардошти ошӯбҳое, ки ҳангоми корпартоиҳои миллӣ дар солҳои 1911–12 рух дода буданд, нигаронӣ вуҷуд дошт, ки дар Лондон нооромиҳо ҳангоми сар задани ҷанг ба амал меоянд. Ҳамин тариқ, се полки савора - Гвардияи 1 -ум, Гвардияи 2 -юми ҳаёт ва Гвардияи Аспҳои Шоҳӣ - дар ноҳияи Лондон ҷойгир буданд ва барои Қувваҳои Экспедитсионӣ таъин нашудаанд, ки ҳар яки онҳо эскадрильяро барои як полки таркибӣ, ки бо Бригадаи 4 -уми савора хизмат мекарданд, таъмин карданд. . Илова бар ин, се бригадаи артиллерии шоҳонаи саҳроӣ ва як қатор батареяҳои артиллерии шоҳона буданд, ки барои хидмат ба хориҷа таъин нашудаанд.

                                            Пас аз рафтани Нерӯҳои Экспедитсионӣ, ин таъсиси мунтазами се полки савора (то андозае харобшуда) ва панҷ баталёни пиёда [12] - камтар аз даҳяки қудрати муқаррарии ҷангии қувваҳои дохилӣ ва асосан дар атрофи Лондон ҷойгир буд. Ин қувваи мудофиа аз ҷониби воҳидҳои Қувваҳои Ҳудудӣ, ки ҳангоми сар задани ҷанг даъват шуда буданд, илова карда мешуд - дар ҳақиқат, бисёриҳо аллакай ҳангоми таълими сафарбаркунӣ барои таълими тобистонаи худ таҷассум ёфта буданд - ва Захираи махсус.

                                            Нерӯҳои Ҳудудӣ бо қудрати сафарбаркунии чордаҳ дивизия ба нақша гирифта шудаанд, ки ҳар кадоме аз рӯи дивизияи муқаррарӣ бо дувоздаҳ баталёни пиёда, 4 бригадаи артиллерӣ, ду ширкати муҳандисӣ ва ampc. - ва чордах бригадаи савораи Еоманри. Пешбинӣ шуда буд, ки ин воҳидҳо танҳо барои муҳофизати хонагӣ истифода мешаванд, гарчанде ки дар ин ҳолат қариб ҳама ихтиёрӣ ба хидмати хориҷа рафта буданд, аввалин батальонҳо дар моҳи ноябр ба қитъа омада буданд.

                                            Хидмати таҳрир дар хориҷа

                                            Дар Ҳиндустон чилу ҳашт баталёни аскарони пиёда хидмат мекарданд, ки ба эквиваленти чаҳор дивизияи муқаррарӣ-панҷто дар Малта, чор нафар дар Африқои Ҷанубӣ, чор нафар дар Миср ва даҳҳо дигар дар посгоҳҳои гуногуни империалистӣ буданд. Боз як нӯҳ полки савораи муқаррарӣ дар Ҳиндустон, бо ду дар Африқои Ҷанубӣ ва як дар Миср хидмат мекарданд.

                                            Интизор набуд, ки қувваҳои боқимондаи империяи Бритониё ба Қувваҳои Экспедитсионӣ саҳм гузоранд. Қисми зиёди инҳо як қисми Артиши 10-дивизияи Ҳиндустон буданд, омехтаи қувваҳои маҳаллӣ ва банақшагирии мунтазами Бритониё дар моҳи августи соли 1913 оғоз шуда буд, то қувваҳои Ҳиндустонро дар ҷанги Аврупо чӣ гуна истифода бурдан мумкин аст ва нақшаи пешакӣ ки барои ду дивизияи пиёда ва як бригадаи савора сохта шудаанд, ба ҳайати Экспедитсионӣ илова карда шуданд, дар сурате фиристода шуданд, аммо то моҳи октябр ба Фаронса наомадаанд.

                                            Дар ин ҳолат, аксари воҳидҳои гарнизони хориҷӣ дарҳол пас аз иваз кардани онҳо бо батальонҳои территориявӣ хориҷ карда шуданд ва дар Британияи Кабир қисмҳои нави муқаррарӣ ташкил карда шуданд. Ҳеҷ яке аз ин қисмҳо сари вақт барои дидани хидмат бо Қувваҳои Экспедитсионӣ наомадаанд.


                                            Сарбозони қарздор: Дивизияҳои 27 ва 30-и Амрико ва Артиши Бритониё дар Фронти Ипресс, август-сентябри 1918

                                            Ипресс ё "тозакунандагон", ки Томиҳои Бритониё шаҳри бостонии Бельгия меномиданд, синоними Ҷанги Якуми Ҷаҳон аст ва шумораи зиёди фавқулодда дар он ҷо ва дар наздикии он дар ҷараёни задухӯрдҳои ба назар беохир дар тӯли чаҳор сол ҷони худро аз даст додаанд. Ёдгориҳои сершумор ва қабристонҳо манзараро оро медиҳанд ва яке аз даҳшатҳои ҷангро ба ёд меоранд. Яке аз чунин ёдгориҳо ба дивизияҳои 27 ва 30 -уми Амрико эҳтиром мегузорад. Ин ду дивизия, ки асосан аз нерӯҳои Гвардияи Миллӣ иборат буданд, 30 август-1 сентябри соли 1918, вақте ки онҳо нерӯҳои собиқадори Олмонро дар яке аз нуқтаҳои баландтарини ин минтақа, Каммел Ҳилл ва деҳаҳои гирду атрофи Виерстрат, Вормезеле, ва Витшете. Немисҳо дар моҳи апрели ҳамон сол ин вазифаҳоро ба даст оварда буданд, аммо ҳангоми расидани амрикоиҳо дар ақибнишинӣ буданд. Бо вуҷуди ин, онҳо оромона ба нафақа баромаданро рад карданд ва дар ин раванд ба хамирони ҳавасманд дарси ҷанг дар Фронти Ғарбӣ дарс доданд.

                                            Харобаҳои калисои Сент -Мартин ва#8217s дар Ипрес, Белгия, тақрибан. 1918. (Департаменти ҷанг)

                                            Вақте ки ин амалиёт оғоз шуд, амрикоиҳо дар марҳилаи дуввуми таълим аз ҷониби сарбозони беҳтарини иттифоқчиён буданд. Чанде пас аз расидан ба Фронти Ғарбӣ дар баҳори 1918, фармондеҳи Қувваҳои Экспедитсионии Амрико (AEF) генерал Ҷон Ҷ. Першинг бо хоҳиши худ дивизияҳои 27 ва 30 -ро барои тамрин бо артиши Бритониё фиристод. Ин роҳи ӯ буд, ки маршал фелдмаршал сэр Дуглас Ҳейгро ором кунад, ки исрор меварзид, ки хамирҳои амрикоӣ ба Қувваҳои Экспедитсионии Бритониё (BEF) муттаҳид шаванд, то сафи артиши камшумори ӯро пур кунанд. Аммо Першинг нақшаҳои дигар дошт. Вай саъй кард, ки артиши мустақил таъсис диҳад ва ба фишори доимии Ҳейг муқобилат кунад. Танҳо вақте ки Департаменти Ҷанги ИМА пешниҳоди Бритониёро дар бораи интиқоли нерӯҳои амрикоӣ ба Аврупо қабул кард, Першинг ба амрикоиҳо иҷозат дод, ки бо Томиҳои Ҳейг тамрин кунанд. Илова бар ин, Першинг розӣ шуд, ки бритониёӣ одамони худро муҷаҳҳаз, ғизо ва мусаллаҳ мекунад ва дар сурати рух додани ҳолати фавқулодда онҳо низ метавонанд дар фронт истифода шаванд. Тибқи ин барномаи омӯзишӣ, даҳ шӯъбаи амрикоӣ дар бахши Бритониё ҳамчун Корпуси II Амрико кор мекарданд. Созишнома инчунин ба амрикоиҳо фоида овард, зеро Департаменти Ҷанг барои фиристодани сарбозон ба хориҷа интиқол надошт ва инчунин силоҳҳои кофӣ барои додани ҳар як сарбоз надошт.

                                            Аммо, сулҳ байни ду фармондеҳ коҳиш ёфт, вақте ки Першинг ҳашт дивизияро ба Артиши Якуми Амрикоии навтаъсиси худ таъин кард. Першинг мехост ҳамаи даҳ дивизияро бозпас гирад, аммо Ҳейг шадидан эътироз кард ва иҷозат дода шуд, ки ду - 27 ва 30 -умро нигоҳ дорад. Онҳо ҳамчун корпуси хурдтарини АЭФ дар қафо монданд.

                                            Ҳейг ҳоло тақрибан 50 000 сарбози тозаи амрикоӣ дошт, ки мувофиқи хости худ истифода мебурд. Шӯъбаи AEF тақрибан 27,000 афсарон ва мардонро дар бар мегирифт, аммо 27 ва 30 ҳеҷ гоҳ ба ин қудрат нарасидаанд. Бригадаҳои артиллерии онҳо алоҳида ба Фаронса омаданд ва фавран ба Артиши якум таъин карда шуданд. Першинг инчунин то 27 -ум ва 30 -юм ҷойгузиниҳоро то пас аз барҳамдиҳӣ ҷудо накард, ин нишонаи он буд, ки вай онҳоро нисбат ба дигар бахшҳои худ аҳамияти камтар дошт.

                                            Пеш аз расидан ба Фаронса, Дивизияи 27 -ум дар Кэмп Вадсворт, Каролинаи Ҷанубӣ, дар наздикии Ашевилл, Каролинаи Шимолӣ ва кӯҳҳои Блу Ридж таълим мегирифт. Аксари дивизияҳои артиш барои омӯзиш ба ҷанубу ҷанубу шарқи Иёлоти Муттаҳида фиристода шуданд. "Шабҳо сахт хунук буданд, аммо офтоб дар давоми рӯз гарм хоҳад буд" гуфт узви батальони 104 -уми пулемёт Вилям Ф.Кларк. Бесабаб набуд, ки аз "як рӯз дар майдони парма ё аз пиёда дар масофаи даҳ мил, ки сахт тар карда буд ва баъд қариб ях карда, шабона мемурд."

                                            Генерал-майор Ҷон Ф.О'Райан фармондеҳи дивизияи 27-ум ва афсари баландрутбаи Гвардияи Миллӣ буд, ки дар давоми ҷанг ба чунин як гурӯҳи калони нерӯҳо фармондеҳӣ мекард. Вай як интизомдор буд ва сарбозони ӯ барои рафтори касбии худ эътироф карда шуданд, ки дар баробари қисмҳои Артиши муқаррарӣ ҷой гирифтаанд. Дивизия аз нирӯҳои саросари Ню Йорк иборат буд, аз ҷумла мардони баъзе оилаҳои машҳури шаҳри Ню -Йорк, инчунин деҳқонон ва коргарон аз тамоми Империяи Стейт. Пеш аз хидмат дар хориҷа, Ню -Йоркҳо дар соли 1916 ҳангоми экспедитсияи ҷазо ҳамчун дивизияи 6 ба сарҳади Мексика фиристода шуданд, ягона воҳиди посбонон, ки бо ин тарз ташкил карда шуда буданд. Дивизияи 27 нишонаеро қабул кард, ки аз ҳалқаи сиёҳи сарҳади сурх бо ҳарфҳои "NYD" дар монограмма бо ситораҳои бурҷи Орион, ба ифтихори фармондеҳи онҳо иборат буд.

                                            Дивизияи 30 -ум бештар ба Гвардияи миллӣ хос буд. Маҷмӯи полкҳо аз Каролинаи Шимолӣ ва Ҷанубӣ ва Теннесси, дивизия дар Камп Севиер, дар наздикии Гринвилл, Каролинаи Ҷанубӣ ҷамъ омаданд. Дар ҷараёни ҷанг, нӯҳ афсари генералии гуногун ба дивизия фармондеҳӣ мекарданд, то он даме ки артиш дар як ҳамсинфи Вест Пойнт генерал -майор Эдвард М.Льюис, ки қаблан Бригадаи 3 -юми пиёдагард, дивизияи 2 -ро сарварӣ мекард, фармондеҳӣ мекард. Дивизияи 30 -ум, ки бо номи "Ҳикори кӯҳна" пас аз президент Эндрю Ҷексон лақаб дорад, шӯъбаҳоеро дар бар мегирифт, ки насли онҳо ба ҷанги соли 1812 тааллуқ доранд. Мисли полкҳои 27 -ум, полкҳои дивизияи 30 -ум дар марзи Мексика ҳангоми Экспедисияи ҷазоӣ хизмат мекарданд.

                                            Писарбачаи полки 71 -уми пиёда, Гвардияи Миллии Ню Йорк, ҳангоми рафтани полки ӯ ба Кэмп Вадсворт, Спартанбург, СС, ки дар он ҷо дивизияи Ню Йорк барои хидмат омӯхта мешавад, бо дӯстдоштаи худ видоъ мекунад. 1917. IFS.

                                            Дар тӯли зиёда аз ҳашт моҳ, ҳарду дивизия аз омӯзиши шадиди ҷисмонӣ гузаштанд, машқҳоро дар ҷанги кушод гузаронданд ва дар лексияҳои афсарони Бритониё ва Фаронса ба сифати мушовир ба ИМА фиристода шуданд. Қисмҳои дивизияҳои 27 ва 30 -ум дар ҳафтаи охири моҳи майи соли 1918 ба Фаронса ворид шуданро оғоз карданд. Воридшавӣ ба бандарҳои Кале ва Брест, амрикоиҳо бо раъду барқҳои дурдасти тӯпхонаҳо ва ҳамлаҳои шабонаи ҳавоии Олмон ба минтақаи ҷанг истиқбол карда шуданд. Пас аз чанд рӯзи раҳпаймоии шадид, ҳарду дивизия ба як бахши паси хатти пеши Бритониё таъин карда шуданд, то омӯзишро оғоз кунанд. Барои таъмини мутобиқат бо сарбозони бритониёӣ, аз амрикоиҳо талаб карда мешуд, ки милтиқи 30 калибри модели 1917-ро бо Ли-Энфилд Марк III савдо кунанд.

                                            Барномаи омӯзишӣ, ки махсус барои ин дивизияҳо тарҳрезӣ шуда буд, аз даҳ ҳафтаи омӯзиш барои сарбозони пиёда ва пулемёт иборат буд, ки дар се давра иҷро карда мешаванд. Аввалан, онҳо ҳадди аққал чаҳор ҳафта берун аз хат тайёр карда шуданд, ки машқҳо, мушаксозӣ ва машқҳои ҷисмониро дар бар мегиранд. Ин дарси автоматӣ Люис ва дигар аслиҳаи пиёдаро дар бар мегирифт. Сипас, амрикоиҳо мебоист бо сарбозони Бритониё дар тӯли се ҳафта пайваст шаванд. Офицерон ва афсарони ғайрирасмӣ ба муддати чилу ҳашт соат ворид мешуданд, дар ҳоле ки ин мардон бо ширкатҳо ва взводҳои бритониёӣ ба муддати кӯтоҳ ҳамроҳ мешуданд. Ниҳоят, ҳар як полк мебоист дар тӯли се то чор ҳафта дар минтақаи ақибгоҳ таълим диҳад, то дастуроти мукаммалтар диҳад. Дар он ҷо амрикоиҳо батальонҳо ва ротаҳоро идора мекарданд. Дар аксари ҳолатҳо хамирбонҳо ва Томиҳо бо ҳам хуб муносибат мекарданд. Тааҷҷубовар нест, ки амрикоиҳо аз хӯроки Бритониё шикоят карданд. Ба хӯрокҳои амрикоӣ, ки дар қисмҳои зиёд хизмат мекунанд, одат карда, ба ҷои онҳо як пораи хурди гӯшт, чой (ба ҷои қаҳва) ва панир дода мешуд.

                                            Дар давраи дуюми омӯзиш, дивизияҳои 27 ва 30 -ум барои омӯзиш ба Артиши дуюми Бритониё таъин карда шуда, барои ташкил ва дифоъ кардани як қисми хати Поперингхеи Шарқӣ ба бахши худ, дар ҷанубу ғарби Ипресс кӯчиданд. Ин мавқеъ номи худро аз шаҳри Поперингхе гирифтааст, ки дар масофаи чанд километр шимол ҷойгир аст ва аз системаи номунтазами хандақҳои пайвастнашуда, қалъаҳо ва қуттиҳои пилла иборат аст.

                                            Дар қисми аввали моҳи август, дивизияи 30 -юм дар наздикии Поперингхе ва Вату кӯчид, ки дар он таҳти назорати тактикии Корпуси II Бритониё қарор гирифт, дар ҳоле ки 27 -ум мавқеи дуввум ё захираро дар муҳофизати Бритониё дар наздикии Кемел Ҳилл, дар зери фармондеҳии Корпуси XIX Бритониё. Ба он кӯли Дикебуш ва минтақаҳои Шерпенберг шомил буданд.

                                            Дар ниҳоят, 30 -ум ба ҳамон бахши захиравӣ, ки 27 -ум аст, пеш рафт ва ҳарду дар рӯ ба рӯи шимоли ҷолиби Лис, як фронт, ки 4000 ярдро фаро гирифт. Баҳор дар хати Иттифоқчиён дар ҷануби Ипресс дар баҳори соли 1918 таъсис ёфтааст, вақте ки немисҳо ҳангоми амалиёти Ҷорҷетт дар соҳили дарёи Лис ҳамла карда, Кемелл Ҳиллро аз фаронсавӣ гирифтанд. Як афсари бритониёӣ навишт, ки "аз даст додани Кемелт аз ҷониби фаронсавӣ хуб аст, ки мо онро ба ҳар ҳол нигоҳ медоштем, то онҳоро камтар бефарҳангӣ кунад."

                                            Нишондиҳанда аз кӯли Зиллебеке, як вақтҳо оби асосии Ипрес, дар ҷанубу шарқи Вормезеле, паҳн шуд. Он дар натиҷаи ҷанги First Ypres дар соли 1914 ташаккул ёфта буд ва ҷанги минбаъда кратерҳои амиқро ба вуҷуд овард. Замин хеле паст буд ва сӯрохиҳои снарядҳо ба ҳавзҳои хурд табдил ёфтанд. Дар гирду атроф қитъаи баланд воқеъ буд-қаторкӯҳи Расадхона, Пиччендели қаторкӯҳ, қаторкӯҳи Мессинес-Витшете ва Камемл Ҳилл, ки ҳамаашон дар дасти немисҳо буданд. Ин мавқеъҳо ба душман имкон доданд, ки дар ҳама самтҳо майдони равшани оташфишонӣ дошта бошад. Як амрикоӣ мушоҳида кард, ки аксар вақт "мардони системаҳои пешрафта гумон мекарданд, ки онҳо аз тӯпхонаи худ тирборон карда мешаванд, дар сурате ки снарядҳо аз таппончаи душман дар тарафи рост ва ақиб буданд."

                                            Батальонҳои полки 119 ва 120 -уми дивизияи 30 -ум қисмҳои фронтро дар бахши канал, даҳ мил ҷанубу ғарби Ипресс оғоз карданд. Як полк лагери худро дар "Сатили ифлос", дар масофаи чор мил аз Ипрес ҷойгир кард. Сарбозон дар кулбаҳое, ки Бритониё дар як дарахтони булут сохта буданд, ҷойгир буданд, ки барои ҷойгир кардани як рота (256 афсар ва мард) кофӣ буданд. Маҳаллаҳо аз боҳашамат дур буданд - набудани катича ё бистар маънои онро дошт, ки сарбозон дар фарш мехобиданд. Аммо барои афсарони фармондеҳӣ ва штабҳои 27 ва 30, он хеле фарқ мекард. Қароргоҳи 27 дар Оудезеле нигоҳ дошт, дар ҳоле ки дивизияи 30 фармондеҳии худро дар Вату таъсис дод, ки дар он О'Райан ва Люис дар роҳати нисбӣ хоб буданд. Бисёре аз кормандони дивизияҳо ва афсарони калони полк дар он маконе ҷойгир буданд, ки "Хут Армстронг" ном дошт. Ҷойгиршаванда ва ба осонӣ кӯчонидашуда, паҳлӯҳои кулбаҳо бо халтаҳои қум пӯшонида шуда буданд, то сокинонро аз пораҳои снарядҳо ва снарядҳо муҳофизат кунанд, агар дар наздикии гирду атрофи тӯпхона тӯпхона бошад. Соҳилҳои халтаҳои қум се фут баландӣ доштанд, ки "кофӣ барои пӯшонидани шумо ҳангоми хоб дар болои кат".

                                            Миқёси девор дар Camp Wadsworth, S.C. Ca. 1918. Пол Томпсон. (Департаменти ҷанг.)

                                            Ҳарду дивизия акнун ҳамагӣ чаҳор мил аз фронт ва дар ҳудуди тӯпхонаҳои душман ҷойгир буданд. 13 июл, узви Роберт П.Фридман, узви 102d Engineers, дар натиҷаи захмҳо аз снаряди Олмон ҷон дод ва аввалин қурбонии ҷангии дивизияи 27 гардид. Фридман яке аз сарбозони зиёди яҳудӣ буд, ҳам афсарон ва ҳам сарбозон дар 27, ва талафоти ӯро ҳама дар дивизия мотам гирифтанд. Дивизияи 30-ум аввалин марги марбут ба ҷангро як моҳ пеш аз он дошт, вақте лейтенанти аввал Вилли О.Биссет аз 119-уми пиёда, 17 июн ба ҳамин тарз кушта шуд.

                                            Дар Бельгия амрикоиҳо шоҳиди душвориҳое буданд, ки мардуми осоишта аз сар гузарониданд. Гарчанде ки тирандозӣ деҳаҳои атрофи Ипресро хароб карда буд, аммо рӯҳи мардуми фламандиро шикаста натавонист. Вақте ки деҳқонон киштзорҳои худро идома медоданд, ба муҳандисони дивизияҳои амрикоӣ дар хатти мудофиаи Поперингхеи махсус дастур дода шуд, ки ба зироат зарар нарасонанд. Ин як фармони душвор буд, зеро риоя накардани сим дар наздикии фронт, сарфи назар аз эътирози деҳқонон, тоза кардани баъзе зироатҳо буд.

                                            Дар тӯли якчанд шаб, аз 16 то 24 август, дивизияҳои 27 ва 30 ба ҷанг омода шуданд. Дивизияи 30 -ум ба 60 бригадаи пиёдагардони худ фармон дод, ки бахши каналро аз дивизияи 33 -юми Бритониё, ки дар рӯ ба шимоли ҷанубу ғарби Ипрес воқеъ аст, бигирад. Аскарони 119 -ум дар тарафи рости хат, 120 -ум пиёда дар тарафи чап буданд. Дар захира Бригадаи 59 -уми пиёда (полки 117 ва 118) ҷойгир буд. Пас аз як ҳафта, Бригадаи 53 -юми пиёдагард (полкҳои 105 -ум ва 106 -уми), дивизияи 27 -ум, дивизияи 6 -уми Бритониёро дар бахши Дикебуш озод кард. Он фронт ва мавқеъҳои ёрирасонро бо полкҳо паҳлӯ ба паҳлӯ ва бригадаи 54 -уми пиёдагард (полкҳои 107 ва 108) дар захира ишғол кард. Дивизияхои Англия подразделенияхои артиллерии худро тарк карда, барои дастгирии америкоиён.

                                            Ҳаракатҳои қӯшунҳо, инчунин интиқоли маводҳо тавассути роҳи оҳани сабук сурат мегирифтанд ва шабона барои пешгирии ҷалби оташи артиллерияи Олмон дар Каммел Ҳилл гузаронида мешуданд. Пеш аз воҳидҳои пиёда ва пулемёт муҳандисони 102д (27 -ум) ва 105 -ум (дивизияи 30 -юм) буданд. Онҳо вазифаи душвор ва хатарноки таъмири роҳҳои пурқувватро доштанд, ки пас аз сесолаи снаряд қариб ғайриимкон буданд. Пас аз он ки сарбозон ба фронт расиданд, онҳоро дар кулбаҳои чӯбӣ, ки муҳандисони бритониёӣ сохтанд, ҷойгир карданд. Ду дастаи иборат аз ҳаштнафарӣ, ки сарпарасташ капитан буд, дар кулбае хобиданд, ки яке аз сокинонаш онро васеъ номид. Барои ҳамоҳангсозии алоқа байни аскарони пиёда ва артиллерия, тафсилоти кор бояд сим кашида мешуд. Ин маънои кофтани чуқури шаш футро аз гили сахти Фландрия дошт, ки ба хоки Каролинаи Ҷанубӣ монанд набуд.

                                            Ҳар рӯз назорат аз постҳои назоратӣ ва ҳавопаймоҳо иборат буд. The first few days were reported as calm. A “quiet, inoffensive attitude,” is how a 30th Division officer summarized this period. Such calm, however, did not last. Suddenly, as the division’s historians noted, “the scene had now shifted to the battleground of the World War—a stern and terrible reality to the men of all ranks.” They were referring to night patrols sent out as far as 1,000 yards to probe enemy defenses. Troops patrolling too close to the German outpost lines were greeted with machine gun fire.

                                            At first, the Germans were unaware that Americans had entered the sector opposite them, but according to a prisoner interrogated at 27th Division headquarters, this changed when the rifle fire became “more brisk and haphazard.” When asked to elaborate, the soldier from the German 93d Infantry Regiment explained that soldiers “who have been in the war for some time only fire individually when they are sure they have a target, whereas new troops are apt to fire more or less constantly at night, whether or not they have a target.” The considerable shooting and muzzle flashes allowed the Germans to better pinpoint the American line of advance. Once they recognized that untested American troops were opposing them, it became a daily ritual to try their mettle by harassing them with artillery fire, lobbing shells into back areas to hit crossroads and villages.

                                            On 30 August, the enemy conducted a surprise move that further tested the doughboys. In the early morning, heavy clouds of smoke crept toward the American lines. An initial report said it was a gas attack, but further observation revealed the Germans were burning dumps of some kind to mask a withdrawal. A prisoner captured near Kemmel Hill confirmed the updated report when he told interrogators that troops were retiring to the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge. He claimed a new line was established in front of Armentieres, and that eight men per company in machine gun posts remained behind on Kemmel, where they were to give the impression of strength.

                                            That night British XIX Corps headquarters ordered O’Ryan to send patrols from his brigades to reconnoiter the left of the line, opposite the 30th Division. This order was not unexpected. Earlier in the day O’Ryan and Plumer met and the latter remarked casually after tea, “Oh, by the way, O’Ryan, how would you like to have a go at our friends on the ridge?” O’Ryan responded that “his men were there for that purpose,” and was then told by Plumer to have a word with his chief of staff. O’Ryan then discovered that the details of the plan and tentative corps order were already in place.

                                            O’Ryan went into action and instructed the 53d Brigade to move elements of the 105th and 106th Infantry Regiments toward the German trenches to determine the depth of the withdrawal. As they approached the German lines, there was minor resistance from scattered machine gun posts. The patrols were accompanied by members of the British 184th Tunneling Company, which checked the vacant enemy dugouts for mines and booby traps. After reaching the enemy positions, the patrols reported back to brigade headquarters that the prisoner’s statement was correct—the Germans had given up most of Kemmel Hill. Additional patrols were organized and told to be ready to advance in support of those sent out. Soon, the Americans were gearing up for their first battle as entire regiments.

                                            On 31 August, the British II Corps ordered the 30th Division to send out patrols in its sector to determine enemy strength and location. The division commander, Major General Lewis, chose the 60th Infantry Brigade and made it clear that if strong resistance was met, the brigade was to return to its entrenchments. Small parties from the 119th and 120th Infantry Regiments moved out, and like those of the 53d Brigade, found the German defenses at Kemmel Hill mostly abandoned. Additional parties from the 30th Division held nearby positions at the Voormezeele Switch and Lock 8 of the canal. The Germans were still close by in strength, so Lewis ordered his troops to hold tight and await further orders. Relaying messages was difficult because the Germans kept a close eye on the runners and frequently fired on them, so the Americans mostly communicated by wire. To ensure there was little delay in this method, the 105th Signal Battalion laid 15,000 feet of cable along this position to establish a forward communications post.

                                            At 0730 the next morning, Lewis gave the order to advance. After a brief barrage, a platoon of forty men from Company I, 120th Infantry, moved forward towards Lankhof Farm. There, the Germans had constructed a cluster of pillboxes in the ruins of an old farm building and positioned machine gunners and snipers. As the Americans advanced, the Germans withdrew to the canal and abandoned their defenses at the farm, suffering only two casualties. The platoon then pushed beyond the farm and established contact with the 119th Infantry advancing on the right of Lock 8. Artillery from the British 33d Division fired in support, but several rounds fell short, wounding a number of Americans.

                                            Friendly fire incidents were an unfortunate consequence of war, and the 30th Division had recently lost two men this way. In the first instance, First Lieutenant Robert H. Turner of the 115th Machine Gun Battalion was struck on 24 July by a shell from the 186 Battery, Royal Field Artillery, while he and another officer were on patrol near a Belgian chateau. In the second occurrence, Second Lieutenant Lowell T. Wasson of Company M, 120th Infantry, was shot by a private from his unit on 7 August. Wasson apparently became confused after returning from a patrol near Swan Chateau and had entered a listening post unannounced. The private guarding the post was ordered to fire on Wasson by his superiors, who thought the intruder was a German conducting a trench raid.

                                            With the 119th taking fire from both its own artillery support and the Germans, two more platoons from the 120th Infantry were sent forward to help relieve the chaotic situation. After advancing 1,000 yards, they retired, having lost touch with both flanks. The Germans complicated matters with fire from trench mortars and machine guns hidden in Ravine Wood. At 1000, 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, advanced and held on against heavy resistance. During this action, a patrol that included Corporal Burt T. Forbes of Company I, was acting as a flank guard when a squad of eight Germans approached. As the enemy started setting up their machine guns, Forbes charged the Germans, single-handedly killing three and driving the other five away. For this act of bravery, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the French Croix de Guerre. Word of the action was sent to the rear by pigeon. It was the first time this means of communication had been used by the 30th. Remarkably, only one hour and five minutes elapsed between the time the message was sent, received and transmitted by the division staff.

                                            After intense fighting, the 30th Division’s contribution to the operation was over. It gained one square mile of ground, inflicted one hundred German casualties, and captured sixteen prisoners, two machine guns, one grenade launcher, and a small amount of ammunition and stores. Kemmel Hill was now in Allied hands and, as one doughboy remarked, “it sure is a blessed relief to move around without feeling the German eyes watching you.” In the process of taking this coveted piece of land, the 30th lost two officers and thirty-five men killed.

                                            In the 27th Division sector, the British XIX Corps ordered O’Ryan to begin advancing his division at 1000 on 31 August and occupy a line along the Vierstraat Switch, 1,000 yards from their present location. Patrols from the 106th Infantry advanced along the line until held up for three hours by machine guns concealed in numerous nests near Siege Farm. The Americans retaliated with their own machine guns, and artillery fire from the British 66th Division. By 1730, the Germans had been driven back and the objective gained.

                                            August ended as another bloody month on the Western Front, and September started off the same way. On the morning of 1 September, the 105th Infantry went forward on its right to pivot on the 30th Division at Vierstraat Village. As the Americans attempted to advance to the east crest of Vierstraat Ridge, the Germans continued to resist and drove the Americans back to the village. During the fighting, the doughboys used some creative methods to send messages to the rear the 102d Signal Battalion sent messages using pigeons and dogs. Amazingly, the dogs successfully maneuvered over broken ground, under heavy fire to deliver messages.

                                            Despite such valiant efforts, communication was still difficult, as reflected in a frantic field message sent from 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry: “Our new position very heavily shelled, making communications almost impossible…request that artillery open fire on hill opposite our new position.” Information on why the regiment was stalled did not reach brigade headquarters until late in the day on 1 September. Messages were delayed because shellfire had cut the forward communication wire. To help remedy the troubling situation, Corporal Kenneth M. McCann of the 102d Field Signal Battalion worked for seventy-two hours, while subjected to repeated gas bombardments and machine gun fire, to replace the forward line near Kemmel Hill. For his extraordinary efforts, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

                                            More discouraging news reached the rear from an officer observing at the front. On the left of the 106th Infantry, two battalions had become badly mixed up and crowded into the line. When word reached the 53d Infantry Brigade commander, Brigadier General Albert H. Blanding, he ordered the commander of the 106th, Colonel William A. Taylor, to the front to investigate. Taylor reported two hours later that the officer in command at the front, Major Harry S. Hildreth, had “apparently entirely lost control and seemed at a loss as to what to do.” Blanding ordered Taylor to immediately relieve Hildreth and take command. Not until daylight the following morning was the situation in hand. Hildreth was only temporarily reprimanded. He was lucky this was his only punishment since it was commonplace in the AEF, as well as the BEF, to permanently relieve commanders from their units for poor performance. Hildreth returned to battalion command in the 106th a few days later.

                                            On 1 September, Blanding ordered his brigade not to make a general attack, but to advance the front line as far as possible. With the help of artillery harassment, the two regiments moved forward, and by the afternoon of the next day, had captured the southern slope of Wytschaete Ridge. At noon on 2 September, Taylor phoned Blanding and requested permission to dig in on the line of the first objective and wait for relief. His request was denied. Instead, he was ordered to advance further, and after another day of hard fighting, the 106th permanently reoccupied the Chinese Trench, which ran between the Berghe and Byron Farms. By now, the Germans had retired in some strength to Wytschaete Ridge. The two-day operation ended with the 53d Brigade losing two officers and seventy-seven men killed, mostly from artillery fire.

                                            On 3 September, the Americans received withdrawal orders, and moved back from the Canal and Dickebusch sectors during the next two days. The British 41st Division relieved the 27th, and the British 35th Division took the sector vacated by the 30th. Relief of the 27th did not go smoothly. When the order reached the 53d Brigade, it was so far forward that it took a considerable amount of time to reach the light railways for transportation to the rear. After reaching the rear, the brigade found that the 41st Division was in the midst of moving forward, and considerable congestion ensued. Once behind the front lines, the soldiers of the 27th Division, looking forward to warm beds and clean uniforms, discovered that billeting and bathing facilities were hard to find. O’Ryan later wrote that provisions had been made for his men, “but the lack of time and other circumstances prevented it being done to the fullest extent.” For the men of 30th Division, it was also “rather a hard trip, but the men stood it well,” remembered the commander of the 105th Engineers. “The cars were dirty and those for the First Battalion had manure in them when they were backed on the siding. Our men had to clean them out and then buy straw to put on the bottom of the cars. I may be mistaken, but the trains the British use for a trip like this are better and cleaner cars. We seem to be the ‘Goats’.”

                                            In the rear, battalion and company commanders from both American divisions wrote after-action reports that provide a window into the seemingly chaotic American experience of being in the line for the first time. In one report, a lieutenant in the 119th Infantry complained that his platoon’s ammunition supply was defective, and for twenty-four hours, he had no reserve rounds. Another officer remarked how the supply of water that reached the front lines during the nights of 2-3 September was not enough for one platoon, and that “this shortage, which seems to exist in all parts of the line, is the greatest hardship the men have to bear.”

                                            Other mistakes were not so insignificant and showed the weaknesses in the divisions’ officer corps. Upon reaching an objective, a platoon commander could not communicate with his left flank because he did not have a telephone, lamp, pigeons, or even a signalman. “Liaison was poor,” he complained. “I had no ground flares, no panels, and no other means of getting in touch with aeroplanes.”

                                            Such mishaps by the doughboys were also observed by the opposing German troops. The commander of the German 8th Infantry Division, Major General Hamann, remarked in his battle report that “withdrawal of our line confronted the American troops with a task to which they were by no means equal.” When the 27th Division moved out of its quiet sector to pursue the Germans, Hamann wrote, “The inexperienced troops do not yet know how to utilize the terrain in movement, work their way forward during an attack, or choose the correct formation in the event the enemy opens artillery fire.”

                                            After the war, Hamann was more complimentary toward the New Yorkers. O’Ryan had written him to gather information for his book, The Story of the 27th, and the German officer responded, saying “reports reaching me from all sources, particularly from our artillery observation posts, were that your infantry was unusually energetic in their attack.”

                                            Enlisted men had plenty to say about the Ypres-Lys operation, and they wrote such thoughts in letters sent home, personal diaries, and memoirs. The sound of battle created a lasting memory for many soldiers. One soldier from Tennessee described the constant firing of machine guns as though it were “popcorn popping.” Another wrote how it seemed to him that the Germans knew the location of every trench, since they constantly harassed the Americans during the day with artillery fire. At night, their planes bombed the front and rear, and the “artificial camouflage provided what little deception was practiced upon the enemy.”

                                            The historian of Company K, 117th Infantry, recalled that “the night of the big barrage on Kemmel Hill was a night of discomfort and nervousness” among the men in his unit. Nerves were frayed, and one private recalled seeing a sergeant in his company advance cautiously with his rifle toward a noise in the rear that he insisted was caused by German soldiers conducting a raid. Moments later, he learned it was a trench rat retreating to its hole. Once the men of Company K actually participated in combat, they “were happier than we had been for many months, for the first battle experiences had been met with all the credit that was to have been expected, and we had not quailed at the smell of gunpowder.”

                                            Bravery by the American soldiers did not go unnoticed by the British. General Sir Herbert Plumer wrote O’Ryan that “the wonderful spirit that animated all ranks and the gallantry displayed in the minor engagements your division took part in with us foreshadowed the successes you would achieve later.” Plumer was indeed correct. The American II Corps would continue serve with the BEF and during the attack on the Hindenburg Line on 29 September 1918, with the Americans attached to the British Fourth Army. Despite taking significant casualties, the 27th and 30th Divisions spearheaded the attack and with help from the Australian Corps, pierced a vital portion of the German defenses along the St. Quentin Canal. Nevertheless, it was the operation in Ypres that helped define the two divisions. After World War I, the newly established American Battle Monuments Commission recognized this in 1927 by placing a marker on Vierstraat Ridge. It reads in part: “Erected by the United States of America to commemorate the service of American troops who fought in this vicinity.”


                                            British Troops being welcomed to France, 1914 - History

                                            The interactive parts of this resource no longer work, but it has been archived so you can continue using the rest of it.

                                            The main job of the British forces in 1914 and 1915 was to support the French. This is because the British Army was very small. In 1914, it had about 250,000 men scattered around the British Empire. In that year, the British sent 5 divisions (a division was usually about 15,000 men) to the front in France. The French army had 72 divisions and the Germans had 122 divisions. The French and Germans both had a system of compulsory military service. This meant all men served about 2 years in the army and gained some basic training and experience. Britain had no such system.

                                            Once war began, the British Army recruited furiously. By 1916, the army was about 1.5 million strong, but there were problems. The expansion was done at breakneck speed using enthusiastic but raw recruits. They had a little over a year's training and virtually no combat experience. Worse still, they were desperately short of experienced officers. More experienced soldiers knew how to find the best cover, how to advance as safely as possible and what to do if their commanding officer was killed (common in trench warfare).

                                            General Sir Douglas Haig, British Commander-in-Chief on the western front, was not really ready to attack in mid-1916. He wanted to wait until later in the year and attack in Flanders (not the Somme). However, his hand was forced. In February 1916, the Germans attacked the French fortress of Verdun. The attack intensified for the next four months until there was a danger that Verdun would fall and the Germans would break through the French lines. The British and French governments decided that Haig would have to attack at the Somme in July. This would be the first major battle of the war for the British Army.

                                            General Sir Henry Rawlinson's original plan of attack was simple. He intended to hit the front line of German defences with intense artillery bombardments to destroy German positions and kill large numbers of troops. The idea was to wear down the Germans in a war of attrition. The main weapon would be the artillery bombardment, but there would also be small-scale raids and attacks by British forces.

                                            Image 1
                                            Map of the Allied plan of attack at the Somme

                                            Haig was sure that the Germans would crumble and he wanted Rawlinson's plan to allow for this possibility. If this took place, then British forces could achieve the long awaited breakthrough. Cavalry could get behind the German defences, attack the Germans in the open and disrupt the road and rail links that kept the German troops supplied and reinforced.

                                            This change in plan caused problems because it meant the artillery bombardment was spread over a wider range of German defences and so did less damage than Rawlinson hoped. It also meant that the attacking infantry were more spread out than Rawlinson planned. This was a problem because they were inexperienced troops and there were few experienced officers. The commanders were concerned that there would be chaos if soldiers charged forward and lost contact with their officers. This was the main reason why orders were given to walk towards the enemy positions. As history now shows, these tactics were disastrous and the senior commanders contributed to the huge death toll during the attack. However, it is important to remember that Haig issued those orders because he felt he had little choice. Units with experienced officers usually adapted the tactics and suffered fewer casualties than units with inexperienced officers.

                                            The attack took place on 1 July 1916. For a week before that, a huge bombardment of German positions had been going on. Most of the British troops expected the German defences to be badly damaged, but it is a myth that they were told that the Germans would simply surrender.

                                            Haig underestimated the strength of the German defences and his changes to the plan weakened the impact of the bombardment. Another problem was that about 30% of the 1.7 million shells fired by the British did not go off. The attacking British troops met extremely strong artillery and machinegun fire from the German defenders. There were some important successes at the southern end of the attacking line, but the troops at the northern end suffered huge casualties. Around 20,000 were killed and around 40,000 wounded.

                                            Rawlinson was appalled by the losses on the first day and wanted to end the attack. However, Haig insisted that it should carry on. He was convinced that they had fatally weakened the Germans, although he had little evidence to support this view. Haig also had little choice because he had to relieve the pressure on Verdun.

                                            Haig was later criticised for wasting lives by throwing men at heavily defended trenches. In fact he varied his tactics when he could. For example, in September he used tanks for the first time in the war. The reality was, however, that Haig had few options. He had to relieve Verdun and he did not have the weapons that commanders in future wars would have – effective aircraft and reliable tanks.

                                            The battle continued until November 1916 when Haig called off the attack. An area of land about 25 km long and 6 km wide had been taken. British casualties ran at about 420,000 and French casualties were about 200,000. German casualties were about 500,000. This definitely weakened the Germans, but the Germans killed more Allied troops than they lost themselves. However, the pressure was off Verdun. The British troops who survived now had combat experience. The British and Allied forces also learnt many valuable lessons about trench warfare, which were put into action in 1917-18.

                                            There are few events in British history that carry as much significance as the Battle of the Somme. The battle has a dark reputation. The main reason for this is the heavy casualties.

                                            Whole villages or sections of towns lost a generation of young men. One of the most famous examples is Accrington in Lancashire. Their young men joined up together in 1915 to form a 'Pals' Battalion. Young men from local streets, factories, football and rugby teams joined up at the same time. The army thought that this local identity would make for good fighting units who would stick together in battle. There were other areas that supplied such units. The very first Pals Battalion was signed up in Liverpool. There were Birmingham, Manchester and Newcastle Pals. The 36th Division was made up mainly of Protestants from Ulster (mainly from the area which is Northern Ireland today). All of these units fought with great gallantry at the Somme. The trouble was it took only one heavy bombardment or one attack on a heavily defended position and a whole street or village lost its young men. Some parts of the country lost few or no young men, but this of course did not grab the headlines. The British Army changed its recruiting policy after the Battle of the Somme.

                                            Another controversy about the Battle of the Somme is whether the British commanders were to blame for the heavy losses because they were incompetent. The main accusations are usually directed at the British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Douglas Haig. He is charged with not caring about the heavy casualties. He is also accused of failing to change his tactics when things were not going according to plan. He earned the unwanted title of 'the Butcher of the Somme'. But was this fair?

                                            The casualties at the Somme were heavy, but only by the standards of previous British wars. British casualties at the Somme were similar to the losses which German, Austrian, Russian and French troops had suffered in many of the battles of 1914-15. This battle had such a huge impact on Britain because Britain had never fought in a war like this before. Most of Britain's wars had been wars in the empire or battles at sea. In both cases, casualties tended to be relatively low.

                                            With hindsight, we can see that Haig made mistakes and the first day of the Somme was a disaster. However, we also have to look at the limited options open to him. He was told to relieve Verdun and this meant attacking the Germans. Haig made mistakes by altering Rawlinson's plan, but he could not foresee that 30% of the British shells would fail to explode. Haig was criticised for sending men to capture enemy trenches, but no politician or military leader came up with any alternatives in 1916. It is very telling that most people at the time did not share the hostility later expressed towards Haig.


                                            British Troops being welcomed to France, 1914 - History

                                            B y the end of November 1914 the crushing German advance that had swallowed the Low Countries and threatened France had been checked by the allies before it could reach Paris. The opposing armies stared at each other from a line of hastily built defensive trenches that began at the edge of the English Channel and continued to the border of Switzerland. Barbed wire and parapets defended the trenches and between them stretched a "No-Mans-Land" that in some areas was no more than 30 yards wide.

                                            British troops in the trenches

                                            Life in the trenches was abominable. Continuous sniping, machinegun fire and artillery shelling took a deadly toll. The misery was heightened by the ravages of Mother Nature, including rain, snow and cold. Many of the trenches, especially those in the low-lying British sector to the west, were continually flooded, exposing the troops to frost bite and "trench foot."

                                            This treacherous monotony was briefly interrupted during an unofficial and spontaneous "Christmas Truce" that began on Christmas Eve. Both sides had received Christmas packages of food and presents. The clear skies that ended the rain further lifted the spirits on both sides of no-mans-land.

                                            The Germans seem to have made the first move. During the evening of December 24 they delivered a chocolate cake to the British line accompanied by a note that proposed a cease fire so that the Germans could have a concert. The British accepted the proposal and offered some tobacco as their present to the Germans. The good will soon spread along the 27-mile length of the British line. Enemy soldiers shouted to one another from the trenches, joined in singing songs and soon met one another in the middle of no-mans-land to talk, exchange gifts and in some areas to take part in impromptu soccer matches.

                                            The high command on both sides took a dim view of the activities and orders were issued to stop the fraternizing with varying results. In some areas the truce ended Christmas Day in others the following day and in others it extended into January. One thing is for sure - it never happened again.

                                            "We and the Germans met in the middle of no-man's-land."

                                            Frank Richards was a British soldier who experienced the "Christmas Truce". We join his story on Christmas morning 1914:

                                            Buffalo Bill [the Company Commander] rushed into the trench and endeavoured to prevent it, but he was too late: the whole of the Company were now out, and so were the Germans. He had to accept the situation, so soon he and the other company officers climbed out too. We and the Germans met in the middle of no-man's-land. Their officers was also now out. Our officers exchanged greetings with them. One of the German officers said that he wished he had a camera to take a snapshot, but they were not allowed to carry cameras. Neither were our officers.

                                            We mucked in all day with one another. They were Saxons and some of them could speak English. By the look of them their trenches were in as bad a state as our own. One of their men, speaking in English, mentioned that he had worked in Brighton for some years and that he was fed up to the neck with this damned war and would be glad when it was all over. We told him that he wasn't the only one that was fed up with it. We did not allow them in our trench and they did not allow us in theirs.

                                            The German Company-Commander asked Buffalo Bill if he would accept a couple of barrels of beer and assured him that they would not make his men drunk. They had plenty of it in the brewery. He accepted the offer with thanks and a couple of their men rolled the barrels over and we took them into our trench. The German officer sent one of his men back to the trench, who appeared shortly after carrying a tray with bottles and glasses on it. Officers of both sides clinked glasses and drunk one another's health. Buffalo Bill had presented them with a plum pudding just before. The officers came to an understanding that the unofficial truce would end at midnight. At dusk we went back to our respective trenches.

                                            British and German troops
                                            mingle in No Mans Land
                                            Christmas 1914
                                            . The two barrels of beer were drunk, and the German officer was right: if it was possible for a man to have drunk the two barrels himself he would have bursted before he had got drunk. French beer was rotten stuff.

                                            Just before midnight we all made it up not to commence firing before they did. At night there was always plenty of firing by both sides if there were no working parties or patrols out. Mr Richardson, a young officer who had just joined the Battalion and was now a platoon officer in my company wrote a poem during the night about the Briton and the Bosche meeting in no-man's-land on Christmas Day, which he read out to us. A few days later it was published in The Times ё Почтаи пагоҳирӯзӣ, I believe.

                                            During the whole of Boxing Day [the day after Christmas] we never fired a shot, and they the same, each side seemed to be waiting for the other to set the ball a-rolling. One of their men shouted across in English and inquired how we had enjoyed the beer. We shouted back and told him it was very weak but that we were very grateful for it. We were conversing off and on during the whole of the day.

                                            We were relieved that evening at dusk by a battalion of another brigade. We were mighty surprised as we had heard no whisper of any relief during the day. We told the men who relieved us how we had spent the last couple of days with the enemy, and they told us that by what they had been told the whole of the British troops in the line, with one or two exceptions, had mucked in with the enemy. They had only been out of action themselves forty-eight hours after being twenty-eight days in the front-line trenches. They also told us that the French people had heard how we had spent Christmas Day and were saying all manner of nasty things about the British Army."

                                            Адабиёт:
                                            This eyewitness account appears in Richards, Frank, Old Soldiers Never Die (1933) Keegan, John, The First World War (1999) Simkins, Peter, World War I, the Western Front (1991).


                                            World War One

                                            The origins of conscription and the ‘citizen-soldier’

                                            The First World War was fought predominantly by conscript armies fielding millions of ‘citizen-soldiers’. The origins of this type of military lay in the levée en masse (mass mobilisation) organised by the French revolutionary regime at the end of the 18th century, the first modern force built on the idea that all male citizens had a duty to bear arms in defence of their nation. However, it was France’s rival Prussia which improved and systemised the military model, developing a new form of universal short-service peacetime conscription. After spectacular victories over Austria and France in 1866 and 1871, this provided the organisational template for other continental European armies. Austria-Hungary imitated it in 1868, France in 1872 and Russia in 1874. Britain and the United States, which relied primarily on their navies for security, were alone among the major powers in remaining with small professional armies.

                                            How conscription worked

                                            Short-service systems of conscription obliged healthy male citizens to undergo a relatively brief period of military training in their youth and then made them subject for much of the rest of their adult lives to call up for refresher courses or for service in an emergency. The exact terms of service varied from country to country but Germany’s system provides a good example. There, men were drafted at age 20 for two or three years of peacetime training in the active army. While all had an obligation to serve, financial limitations meant in practice that only a little over half of each male year group was conscripted. After training, men were released into civilian life but could be called back to the army until they reached the age of 45. In between, men passed through various reserve categories. Those who had most recently completed their training belonged to the first-line reserve for five years, where they could expect to be redrafted early in the event of crisis. Later, they were allocated for a decade to the second-line Landwehr. The third-line Landsturm was the oldest band of reservists, intended mainly for rear-line duties in a major war. The short-service conscript system offered two major advantages. First, it created a large pool of trained manpower that could quickly augment the standing army in an emergency. In August 1914, the German army needed just 12 days to expand from 808,280 to 3,502,700 soldiers. Second, in a long conflict, the system offered an organisational framework capable of deploying nearly the entire manpower of a state as soldiers. Conscript forces became true ‘nations in arms’ in 1914-18. 55% of male Italians and Bulgarians aged 18 to 50 were called to military service. Elsewhere the proportions were even higher: 63% of military-aged men in Serbia, 78% in Austro-Hungary and 81% of military-aged men in France and Germany served.

                                            The picture book of the Landsturm Man

                                            Detail of an illustration from The picture book of the Landsturm Man (1917).

                                            War volunteers and enlistment motivations

                                            While conscript armies proved indispensable, and even the British in 1916 and the Americans in 1917 began to draft men, significant numbers of volunteers also served in the First World War. Most famously, in Britain 2,675,149 men volunteered, the vast majority in the first half of hostilities. However, even countries with long traditions of conscription also had large volunteering movements. In Germany, around half a million men came forward. The great rush was at the start of the war: in the first 10 days 143,922 men enlisted in Prussian units alone. France’s voluntary enlistments were smaller but steadier, reaching 187,905 men by the end of hostilities. In multinational Austria-Hungary, men appear to have been less willing to volunteer for the Emperor’s army, although they promptly obeyed call up orders. Some nationalist movements did recruit successfully, however. The Polish Legionaries, the largest of these forces, had 21,000 volunteers by 1917. While volunteers tended to be disproportionately middle-class, their motives for joining the army may not have been so different from those of conscripts. Patriotic duty appears to have been a prime motivation for both groups, although coercion was also influential. Volunteers were not subject to the legal sanctions faced by conscripts who disobeyed drafting orders but they might be exposed to considerable social pressure to enlist. For small minorities, economic factors or lust for action and adventure were important. These recruits, whether conscripts or volunteers, were ‘citizen-soldiers’, whose attachment to their societies and stake in their states’ existence go far to explain the tremendous resilience of the armies of 1914-18.


                                            A Comprehensive World War One Timeline

                                            Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, and his wife, had decided to inspect Austro-Hungarian troops in Bosnia. The date chosen for the inspection was a national day in Bosnia. The Black Hand supplied a group of students with weapons for an assassination attempt to mark the occasion.

                                            A Serbian nationalist student, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, when their open car stopped at a corner on its way out of the town.

                                            Although Russia was allied with Serbia, Germany did not believe that she would mobilise and offered to support Austria if necessary.

                                            However, Russia did mobilise and, through their alliance with France, called on the French to mobilise.

                                            Despite a French counter-attack that saw the deaths of many Frenchmen on the battlefields at Ardennes, the Germans continued to march into France. They were eventually halted by the allies at the river Marne.

                                            British troops had advanced from the northern coast of France to the Belgian town of Mons. Although they initially held off the Germans, they were soon forced to retreat.

                                            The British lost a huge number of men at the first battle of Ypres.

                                            By Christmas, all hopes that the war would be over had gone and the holiday saw men of both sides digging themselves into the trenches of theWestern Front.

                                            Although British losses were heavier than the German, the battle had alarmed both the Kaiser and the German Admiral Scheer and they decided to keep their fleet consigned to harbour for the remainder of the war.

                                            This article is part of our extensive collection of articles on the Great War. Click here to see our comprehensive article on World War 1.


                                            British Troops being welcomed to France, 1914 - History

                                            The actions of the colonist in response to the Townshend Act convinced the British that they needed troops in Boston to help maintain order. Lord Hillsborough, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dispatched two regiments-(4,000 troops), to restore order in Boston. The daily contact between British soldiers and colonists served to worsen relations.

                                            The decision by the British to dispatch troops to Boston was one of their worst decisions, in an entire series of bad moves, that helped make the eventual independence of America inevitable. The British government reacted to the Americans, and specifically to the Massachusetts opposition to the Townshend act by dispatching troops to Boston. This might have been the correct policy if the opposition was just made up of a few firebrands. The British, however, misread the opposition, which was wide spread.

                                            The announcement that British troops were arriving created immediate resentment among the colonists. The idea that British troops were coming, not to defend the colonists in times of war, but the pacify them, seemed inconceivable to many. In addition, the idea that troops of the standing army, many of whom did not have a reputation for high moral standards, would be living in their city on a daily basis filled many Bostonians with dread.

                                            In the end of September 1768 troop ships, accompanied by British men of war, arrived in Boston Harbor. The troops disembarked and initially encamped on the Boston Commons, as well as, in the Court House, and in Faneuil Hall. Friction immediately broke out when the Governor offered the troops Manufactory House as a barracks. The inhabitants of the Manufactory House refused to be evicted and the troops were forced to find other locations.

                                            The British officers had no trouble finding lodging and being accepted into the Bostonian Society. This was not the case, however, with their soldiers. The British soldiers were consumers of both large quantities of rum and prostitutes. Both these activities were an anathema to the rather puritan population of Boston. Worse still was the harsh discipline meted out to British soldiers.

                                            The British had a major problem with desertions. In the first few months of their stay in Boston, 70 troops deserted and found their way into the interior of the colony. Placing sentries on the outskirts of the city to stop deserters did nothing but inflame colonists further. Finally, General Gage, who had taken command of the British troops in Boston, ordered the next deserters be captured executed. That tragic fate fell on a young deserter named Ames. He was executed on the Boson Commons after and elaborate ceremony. This act disgusted the general population of Boston, even more than the regular whipping of British soldiers on the same location for infractions against army rules.

                                            The colonists' views of the average British soldier varied from resentment to pity. However, while on duty, an almost guerilla war seemed to rage between the soldiers and the colonists. This, of course, eventually resulted in the most well-known and tragic action, known as "the Boston Massacre".

                                            From the moment the British forces entered Boston to the moment they were forced by colonial troops to leave seven years later, their presence did the British no good. The extended British troop presence only served to bring the day of American independence closer.


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